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FINANCIAL SERVICESUsing debit cards to make point-of-sale purchases is extremely popular among Canadians.
Established nationwide over 15 years ago, in 1994, the Interac direct payment system is so
popular today that only Swedes, on a per-capita basis, make more such transactions. 
However, the landscape is about to change, dramatically. VISA and MasterCard are entering
the Canadian debit market. Their presence raises for policymakers issues involving the
efficiency and fairness of the various elements that comprise a national debit card system,
from the financial institution issuing the card through the payment networks, payment
processors and merchants to the card-holding consumer. In short, the playing field is not
even. VISA and MasterCard are largely unregulated when it comes to debit transactions,
while the non-profit Interac association operates under the restrictions of a dated
Competition Tribunal order. 
This Backgrounderconsiders the implications of the rapidly changing debit payment landscape
and makes three recommendations for government action to ensure that consumers and
merchants are protected and that the system can evolve to serve them even better. 
The recommendations are to: 
• remove current restrictions on Interac so that the association can evolve on a for-profit basis; 
￿ minimize differences in rules and standards applied to payment systems; and 
￿ implement a voluntary code of conduct that (i) enhances the level of transparency and
disclosure to merchants, (ii) allows merchants to decline debit services for any
transaction types, and (iii) allows merchants to provide discounts or surcharges related to
type of payment.
Adopting these recommendations would help ensure that Canadians have a debit market that
is both fair and efficient. 
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C
anada has embraced debit cards
like few other countries.
Almost 30 percent of all retail
transactions in Canada are settled by
debit card, making Canadians the
second heaviest per capita debit card
users in the world, behind Sweden
(BIS 2009).
Until recently, effectively all debit card transactions
in Canada were facilitated by Interac, which
operates the networks that make such transactions
possible. The competitive landscape is, however,
changing rapidly and Interac’s dominant position
faces serious challenges. 
Two large payment networks, VISA and
MasterCard, are entering the Canadian debit
market. Canadian financial institutions have
started – or are expected in the near future – to
issue debit cards that can access VISA and
MasterCard networks for debit transactions. This
change should lead to more innovation and
ultimately more attractive debit products for
cardholders and merchants. 
At present, Interac operates at a marketplace
disadvantage in relation to VISA and MasterCard.
Since 1996, the Interac association has operated
under a Competition Tribunal order that
effectively limits its ability to respond to the fast-
changing competitive environment. On the other
hand, VISA and MasterCard are largely
unregulated. 
Furthermore, some market participants have
expressed concerns about the impact of these new
entrants. Merchants in particular are concerned
they will face higher transaction fees.1 Merchants
have also complained about the degree of
disclosure and transparency in the new debit
services being proposed to them. Some business
practices, such as “priority-routing” that give
preference to a particular network over another,
have also been the subject of criticism.
This Backgrounder provides an overview of the
changes that are taking place in the Canadian debit
market and provides recommendations for an
efficient and fair debit payment system. I begin
with an overview of how payment systems work
and discuss the principles that should guide public
policies for these markets. A short history of the
debit market in Canada is followed by a review of
recent changes in the competitive landscape. The
subsequent section considers the potential impacts
of VISA’s and MasterCard’s entry into the
Canadian debit market. The last section provides
recommendations for a more efficient and fair
debit market in Canada. 
The Economics of Payment Systems
Debit card payment systems are not ordinary
markets. Misconceptions in this regard will lead to
false conclusions and suboptimal policy outcomes.
This section provides a brief overview of how such
systems work and presents some basic economic
principles that are helpful in guiding relevant
public policies. First, cardholders and merchants
tend to place a higher value on payment systems
that are more widely used than those that are not.
An important implication of this characteristic,
known as a network effect, is that there are few
payment systems, they tend to be large and, once
established, usually enjoy a competitive advantage.
Furthermore, payment systems share some
characteristics with so-called natural monopolies,
like some utilities, because they require large up-
front investments and benefit from economies of
scale. For these and other reasons, payment
systems are sometimes accused of enjoying a
monopoly-like position, leading to allegations of
“abuse of dominant position” and calls for
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The author wishes to thank Tim Brennan, John Bulmer, Colin Busby, Ben Dachis, Alexandre Laurin, Marc-André Pigeon, Finn Poschmann, 
Bill Robson, Thomas Ross, Roger Ware and members of the C.D. Howe’s Financial Services Research Initiative for helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. 
1 See for example, Canadian Federation for Independent Business, “Member Alert: Read the fine print when signing your debit card agreements,”
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government regulation.2 However, while a
payment system may share similarities with a
monopoly, this does not necessarily imply it is 
one and can abuse its dominant position by, for
example, charging higher prices. A payment
system that is dominant today may not be
tomorrow, and the threat of new entrants puts
important limits on what payment systems can
and cannot do.3 In addition, customers and
merchants can always fall back on a government-
controlled payment system; i.e., cash.
Another characteristic of debit card payment
systems is that they are two-sided markets,
meaning that they compete for two types of
customers; in this instance cardholders and
merchants.4 In a two-sided market, the price
imposed on customers on one side of the market
does not necessarily reflect the costs associated
with providing the service to them. Payment
networks (e.g., Interac or VISA) can shift costs
from one side of the market to the other. For
example, payment networks can take advantage of
the fact that one side may respond differently to
prices (implying that they have different price
elasticities of demand) and could therefore
potentially assume a larger proportion of the cost.
Since payment networks are typically paid on a
per transaction basis, a profit maximizing payment
network would generally set a price structure that
maximizes the level of transactions on its network. 
Higher merchant fees in a card payment system
therefore do not necessarily imply that a particular
system is more costly. Instead, they may imply
simply that it has a different cost structure and
that a greater proportion of the direct cost is
borne by one side of the market. 
In some two-sided markets, all of the cost is
born by one side. Take a shopping mall where
customers have free access to all the facilities while
store owners pay all the direct costs. Merchants
can, however, ultimately pass these costs on to
consumers through higher retail prices.
Two fundamental economic principles should
guide public policy in the debit market: efficiency
and equity. Economic efficiency refers to using
resources in a way that maximizes the production
of goods and services. In more concrete terms, 
an efficient payment system is one that – at the
lowest cost possible – maximizes the attributes
that one expects of a payment system such as
speed, reliability, safety and high levels of
acceptance and convenience.5 According to
standard economic theory, free markets are
believed – under certain conditions – to allocate
resources in such a way as to ensure an efficient
outcome. For this assertion to hold true, 
markets must be competitive. 
An efficient outcome does not necessarily imply,
however, that the gains are distributed evenly in
the economy. An outcome can be efficient even if
all the gains are available only to one person. In
contrast, the concept of equity or fairness is
concerned with how the gains from economic
activity are allocated among individuals. While the
primary objective of public policies related to the
debit card market should be to ensure an efficient
payment system, perceptions of fairness will
influence the acceptability of potential solutions. 
C.D. Howe Institute
2 For example, the merchant associations in Canada  – particularly the Canadian Retail Council and the Canadian Federation of Independent
Business – have recently led a public campaign against alleged abuses on the part of some payment networks, especially in the credit card market.
Their campaign led to parliamentary committee hearings and culminated in a Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce
report entitled “Transparency, Balance and Choice: Canada’s Credit Card and Debit Card Systems,” which was tabled in June 2009. The report
makes a number of recommendations for the credit and debit card market. A copy of the report is available at:
http://www.parl.gc.ca/40/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/bank-e/rep-e/rep04Jun09-e.htm. 
3 For example, the Internet is supporting the emergence of new payment technologies – PayPal is an example – that could one day threaten the
dominant position of current payment networks. 
4 There are numerous other examples of two-sided markets such as shopping malls that compete for both stores and customers and newspapers
that compete for readership and advertising. 
5 For a discussion on economic efficiency in the context of payment networks, see for example Bolth and David (2005).Backgrounder 125 | 3
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The Canadian debit card payment system is
comprised of five main types of participants,
namely cardholders, merchants, payment
processors, payment networks and card issuers
(Bulmer 2009). Payment processors, such as
Moneris Solutions Corp., are responsible for
providing point-of-sale terminals to merchants
and acting as the middleman between merchants
and the rest of the payment system. Payment
networks, such as Interac, are mainly responsible
for the development and operations of the
networks that allow payment processors and card
issuers to communicate with each other to
authorize payments.a Card issuers, as the name
implies, are financial institutions such as banks or
credit unions that issue the cards.b
A typical transaction (Figure 1) begins with a
cardholder making a purchase. Once the
cardholder has confirmed the purchase amount
and entered his/her personal identification
information (PIN) on the terminal, a message is
sent to the payment processor. From there, the
message is forwarded to the card issuer, through 
a payment network, to confirm that the
information entered by the cardholder is correct
and that sufficient funds are available. A return
message to the merchant authorizes the
transaction, or not. If the transaction is approved,
the funds are typically debited from the
customer’s account right away and transferred 
to the merchant on the same, or within one,
business day. 
FEES: In this process, the payment processor, the
payment network and the issuing bank all charge
a fee for their services. The payment processor
collects from the merchant what is referred to as a
merchant discount rate or merchant fee. This fee
covers, among other things, the costs for the
payment processor to process the payment and
the fees that the payment processor transfers to
other participants in the network. The payment
processor pays both an interchange fee to the card
issuer and a switch fee to the payment network.
The interchange fee – a fee that is usually set by
the payment network – can be used as a way to
compensate financial institutions for the cost of
issuing debit cards. They in turn lower, can costs
or offer more benefits to cardholders. The switch
fee is paid to the payment network to compensate
them for the use of their networks. Payment
networks typically collect a switch fee from the
issuing bank as well.
The Interac network currently sets its switch
fee at $0.007299 per transaction.c Currently,
Interac does not charge an interchange fee.The
switch fee for VISA debit transactions in Canada
is not publicly available. VISA sets the
interchange fee at a rate that varies from 0.15
percent of the value of the transaction plus $0.05
per transaction to 1.15 percent of the value of the
transaction (VISA 2009). According to public
statements, MasterCard’s switch fee for debit
transactions is set at $0.005. Like Interac, it does
not currently levy an interchange fee (House of
Commons 2009a). 
Box 1: Primer on the Canadian Debit Card Payment System 
Notes:           a The proprietary networks of payment networks can also be used in some instances to clear and settle payments.
b Some financial institutions such as TD Bank Financial Group are both card issuers and payment processors.
c Interac Association, http://www.interac.ca/members/fees.php.
a The proprietary networks of payment networks can also be used in some instances to clear and settle payments.
b Some financial institutions such as TD Bank Financial Group are both card issuers and payment processors.
c Interac Association, http://www.interac.ca/members/fees.php.6 The institutions are Royal Bank, CIBC, Scotiabank, TD Bank and Desjardins. 
7 Interac actually consists of two entities, Interac Inc. and the Interac Association. Interac Inc. is a corporation that owns the computer software and
the Interac trademark while the Interac Association is responsible for the management of the network’s operations. Furthermore, Acxsys
Corporation, which was founded in 1996 by a group of Canadian financial institutions, provides management services to the Interac Association
and specializes in the development and operation of new payment services, such as Interac Online. Unless otherwise noted, the term Interac refers
to the Interac Association for the purpose of this paper. 
8 The institutions are Bank of Montreal, Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Credit Union Central of Canada and National Bank of Canada.
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A Short History of the Debit Card Market 
in Canada
In the 1970s, Canadian financial institutions began
putting in place proprietary networks of Automated
Banking Machines (ABMs), allowing customers to
access their money outside normal banking hours
and at locations other than their local branch.
Financial institutions quickly recognized the
benefits of connecting together their proprietary
networks, both in terms of reduced costs and
enhanced access for their customers (Competition
Bureau 1996). 
In 1984, five major VISA-issuing financial
institutions6 formed a cooperative venture to link
together their ABM networks, marking the
beginning of the Interac Association.7 By the end of
1985, the four largest MasterCard-issuing financial
institutions had also joined the association.8 In the
early 1990s, Interac launched the Interac Direct
Payment as a pilot project, allowing customers to
use their debit card for point-of-sale purchases. By
1994, Interac Direct Payment was available
nationwide. 
While Canadians quickly adopted Interac’s ABM
and Interac Direct Payment products, the









The merchant receives the 
total amount of the transaction 
less the Merchant Discount 
Rate (In 2006, the median 
MDR was estimated at $0.12).
The total amount of the 
transaction is debited 





 to payment 
processor.
 Cardholder enters information
on terminal for approval
Switch Fee 
(currently set at $0.007).
Switch Fee 
(currently set at $0.007).
 Payment processor transfers payment 
information to card issuer using Interac network. A message is 
then sent back the other way to the merchant, authorizing or not the transaction.
The payment processor receives the total amount of the transaction 
less the interchange fee (currently set at $0).
.
Figure 1: An Illustration of a Debit Payment Transaction on the Interac Network
Source: Adapted from Bulmer 2009.
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operated. The Competition Bureau launched an
inquiry in July 1992 into allegations that Interac
engaged in three broad categories of anti-
competitive acts; namely, restricting access to the
network, creating barriers to product innovation,
and controlling access and service pricing
(Competition Bureau 2002). In 1996, the
Competition Tribunal approved a consent order,
after an extensive public hearing, that is in force
today with only minor changes. (A consent order in
this instance refers to a remedy to abuse of
dominance negotiated between the Competition
Bureau and all relevant parties and subsequently
approved by the Competition Tribunal.)9
Among other things, the consent order:
￿ expanded the list of eligible Interac members.
It was alleged by the Competition Bureau that
the association’s bylaws effectively restricted
the number and type of institutions that could
participate in its network. The consent order
amended the bylaws to allow any commercial
entity to become a member, provided they
were capable of providing services related to
Interac’s debit networks (except for card-
issuing activities). Effectively, Interac’s
membership has been expanded from 27 at
the time of the consent order to 62 at present. 
￿ implemented a new governance structure.
Prior to the consent order, only the charter
members – the large financial institutions that
are directly connected to Interac’s network –
could vote on any matters of significance. The
consent order imposed measures to transfer
some decisionmaking power from charter
members to other Interac members. It
established a board with no fewer than 14
members, with a minimum of two appointed
by non-financial institutions that are directly
connected to Interac’s network and three by
members that are not directly connected.
Fundamental changes10 require a two-thirds
majority. Decisions related to network
enhancements, new services and interchange
fees are subject to a simple majority vote. 
￿ required Interac to set its prices on a cost-
recovery basis. The consent order mandates
that all Interac revenues must be derived from
a “switch fee” – a fee charged on a per message
basis to users of Interac’s network – which is
based on the cost of delivering this service and
on the cost of developing the network. The
consent order also requires Interac Inc. to
operate on a not-for-profit basis. The order,
however, did not restrict the ability of Interac
to set the level of the interchange fee, which it
currently sets at zero percent. 
￿ allowed merchants to impose a surcharge on
Interac debit transactions. Prior to the consent
order, the collection of an additional fee or
surcharge on a cardholder at the point-of-sale
was prohibited. As per the consent order,
merchants can now charge fees to consumers
paying with an Interac debit card on top of
their purchase amount. 
The Changing Competitive Landscape in the
Canadian Debit Card Market
By almost any measure, Interac debit has been a
success. As noted, Canadians are second only to
Sweden in the use of debit cards on a per capita
basis. In 2008, Interac processed 3.7 billion point-
of-sale debit transactions worth approximately
$168 billion (Interac Association 2008). In
addition, Interac is generally the cheapest payment
method for merchants when compared to cash and
credit card transactions (Bank of Canada 2008). 
The competitive landscape is, however, changing
rapidly and Interac’s dominant position is being
9 The Interac consent order is available at http://www.ct-tc.gc.ca/CasesAffaires/CasesDetails-eng.asp?CaseID=160.
10 Fundamental changes are defined as “decisions of the board relating to security, minimum performance standards, use of the trademarks, Interac
structure and membership criteria, board composition and voting rules, and fees (other than interchange fees as defined in the by-laws).”C.D. Howe Institute
seriously challenged. VISA and MasterCard,
which are large for-profit businesses,11 are
currently entering the Canadian debit market.
They are taking advantage of the fact that all
point-of-sale terminals are being gradually
replaced by terminals that can support chip
technology.12 Many of the new terminals are
designed to accept VISA debit and/or
MasterCard’s debit card, Maestro.13
At the same time, at least one financial
institution is issuing debit cards that can potentially
access more than one debit network in Canada and
others are reportedly planning to do so. The chip-
enabled BMO debit cards can access both Interac
and MasterCard’s network for debit transactions.
Other financial institutions will reportedly adopt
the same model where, in addition to Interac, 
debit cards would also be able to access the VISA 
or MasterCard networks.14
Merchants have complained about some of the
business practices associated with the deployment
of these new debit products.15They say the
information received by merchants related to new
debit products sometimes lacks clarity and they are
not always made aware of all the impacts associated
with these products. For example, they say some of
the new point-of-sale terminals appear sometimes
to automatically accept new debit products without
the merchant’s prior consent. The merchants can
decline such new services but must take action with
their payment processors to remove this capability. 
The new debit cards that can access both
MasterCard’s and Interac’s networks, in some
instances, appear to give priority to the former,
meaning that debit card transactions will be routed
on MasterCard’s network if the merchant accepts
both networks (so-called priority-routing). In the
case of debit cards that support both VISA and
Interac’s network, some of the terminals reportedly
provide cardholders with the option of choosing
which payment network he or she wants to use. These
new terminals, however, are expected to present VISA
as the default option, requiring cardholders to decline
VISA debit first if they want to access the Interac debit
option. Finally, merchants are concerned instances
might arise that require them to accept types of debit
card products offered by a network if they already
receive credit card services from the same network. 
The Potential Impact of the Changing
Competitive Landscape
The entry of new players in the debit card market
should be welcome, because increased competition
will help bring new payment technologies to
Canada and ultimately lead to debit cards that are
more attractive to both cardholders and merchants.
From a static point of view, the consent order
allowed Canadians to enjoy a relatively efficient
Interac debit payment system. From a dynamic
perspective, however, more competition is required
to bring new payment services that are faster, more
reliable, safer and more convenient, as well as
widely accepted and delivered at affordable costs.
The increased competition is already helping to
bring new technologies into the Canadian debit
market, such as contactless technologies (which
involve simply waving the card in front of a card
reader), along with the ability to use debit cards for
Internet and international transactions. 
Merchants have raised concerns, however, that
the entry of new players in the debit card market
could translate into higher fees. In debit markets
where VISA and MasterCard operate, the fees
imposed on merchants tend to be higher than those
currently imposed under the Interac network. Most
notably, VISA and MasterCard debit transactions
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11 MasterCard Worldwide and VISA Inc. became publicly traded companies in 2006 and 2008, respectively. 
12 Members of the Canadian payment card industry – including Interac, MasterCard Canada, VISA Canada and many of the associated card issuers
and payment processors – in 2006 announced a broad migration to chip technology over several years. In time, this migration will gradually
replace magnetic strip credit and debit cards with computer-chip cards. Chip cards offer some clear advantages over swipe cards, notably in terms of
enhanced fraud protection.
13 See for example, van Duynhoven, 2009. 
14 Ibid. 
15 See, for example “Debit Card Processing Commentary: Visa and MasterCard Debit: A Major Threat to Interac and Canadian Merchants,”
http://www.cfib-fcei.cain many other jurisdictions require the payment of
an interchange fee (i.e., a fee paid by payment
processors to issuing banks), which represents an
important part of merchant fees.16 Interac currently
does not require any interchange fee for debit
transactions at point-of-sale that transit on its
network, which noticeably reduces the cost born by
merchants. 
While some cards may be associated with higher
interchange fees, it is unclear if they are more
expensive overall. An increase in the interchange fee
allows for the transfer of costs from one end-user to
another, in this case from cardholders to merchants.
If interchange fees are higher, one would expect
that competitive pressure on the issuer side would
produce lower costs or higher benefits, such as the
ability to accumulate rewards, for cardholders. 
For example, debit card issuers in Canada
typically charge cardholders a fee for every debit
transaction or charge for service packages that
include a number of free transactions. (Under
certain circumstances, such as if the customer
maintains a minimum balance, there is no service
package fee). In some other jurisdictions, such as in
the United States where interchange fees are higher,
debit transactions typically do not incur a cost for
cardholders. Nonetheless, in instances where
cardholders do not pay a fee for a particular
transaction in Canada, the total debit fee is
relatively low compared to other countries.
Furthermore, to the extent that higher interchange
fees would lead to increased benefits to cardholders,
the total cost of the system may increase in Canada. 
VISA and MasterCard have successfully gained
market share at the expense of local payment
networks in other countries, which raises fears that
once these new networks establish themselves in
Canada, they will be able to raise their prices. In the
United States, for example, VISA and MasterCard
dominate the signature17 debit market and
Interlink, which is owned by VISA, has become
since 2005 the largest payment network in the PIN
point-of-sale (POS) debit card market.
US payment networks have responded to
competitive pressures by increasing interchange fees
in an effort to encourage card issuers to choose their
networks. Interac has said publicly that, learning
from experiences abroad, it intends to remain a
low-cost provider of debit services (House of
Commons 2009b). If Interac is successful in
pursuing this strategy, it is unclear if interchange
fees will raise to levels seen elsewhere as other
networks operating in Canada may be compelled to
lower their fees to gain merchant acceptance. 
In short, competition is welcome as it should
lead to innovation and better debit services over
Backgrounder 125 | 7
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Table 1: Interchange and Switch fees of Current and Proposed Debit Payment Options in Canada 
Sources: Interac Association, VISA Canada and House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, May 14, 2009.
Interac VISA debit Maestro 
Interchange fees Currently set at
zero percent
Ranges from 0.15 percent of the value of
the transaction plus $0.05 to 1.15 percent 
of the value of the transaction
Currently set at
zero percent
Switch fees Currently set at
$0.007299
Undisclosed Currently set at
$0.005 
16 For example, in the United States, the average signature debit interchange fee in 2003 was US$0.38 per transaction while the average PIN debit
interchange fee was US$0.19 per transaction (Dove Consulting 2004). 
17 Signature cards are debit cards that require the cardholder’s signature for purchase at point-of-sale instead of requiring the cardholder to enter its
PIN number on the terminal. 18 The Department of Finance released a proposed Code of Conduct on November 19, 2009 that was circulated for a 60-day comment period. The
proposed code covers the credit and debit card market and is intended to promote fair business practices and ensure merchants and consumers
clearly understand the costs and benefits of credit and debit cards.
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time. Experiences abroad do suggest, however,
that interchange fees may increase as a result of
increased competition. The dominant position of
Interac, coupled with its stated objective of
remaining a low-cost provider of debit services,
may dampen the increase in interchange fees. In
any event, if competition does translate into
higher interchange fees, it should lead to lower
costs or higher benefits for cardholders.
Efficiency and Fairness: 
A Common Sense Solution
The following recommendations relate to current
developments in the Canadian debit market;
namely, the level of competition, the current lack of
disclosure and transparency provided to merchants,
and other business practices in rolling out the new
debit services to merchants. The recommendations
are provided according to the two public policy
objectives stated above – efficiency and fairness. 
EFFICIENCY: The primary objective of public
policies related to the debit payment market
should be an efficient payment system. In concrete
terms, an efficient payment system is one that
maximizes attributes such as speed, reliability,
safety, high levels of acceptance, convenience and
low cost. Since competition is the best way to
ensure that Canadians receive these benefits, the
entry of VISA and MasterCard in the debit market
is a welcome change. 
Currently, there is little real competition among
debit payment networks. Interac is at a considerable
competitive disadvantage because of the operating
constraints imposed under the consent order. While
the association has been a success so far, the
structure it is operating under is starting to show its
age. Its governance structure makes for slow decision
making, which in the current environment could
lead to Interac being relegated to a backup system
for VISA debit and Maestro. 
Policymakers should allow Interac to transform
itself into a corporation to become more proactive
and respond in a timelier manner to the
unprecedented changes in the marketplace. As a
corporation, Interac would also be able to raise the
capital needed for investments in new products,
marketing and so on. In addition, the reasons
underpinning the consent order – principally that
Interac prevented or substantially lessened
competition in the debit card market – are simply
no longer true with the entry of additional payment
networks. 
Also, the rules of the game need to be the same for
everyone. Interac members clear and settle their
transactions through the Automated Clearing
Settlement System and are therefore subject to the
Canadian Payments Association (CPA)’s rules and
standards. VISA and MasterCard have their own
proprietary clearing and settlement systems and are
not subject to any formal rules or standards in
Canada. The development of new payment methods
and technologies may require the development of
new CPA rules and standards, which are subject to
an extensive internal and external consultation
process. While this process may be important to
ensure that new rules and standards reflect
stakeholder concerns, it may slow down the
introduction of new payment methods by Interac,
providing their competitors with a speed advantage. 
As a general objective, all payment networks
should be subject to broadly similar rules and
standards while taking into account the particular
circumstances under which they operate. At a
minimum, the CPA should ensure that its internal
and external consultation process does not impose
unnecessary delay in bringing new payment
products and services to market. 
Furthermore, competition requires transparency
and disclosure so that market participants make
informed choices. This Backgrounder accordingly
supports current efforts by the federal department
of finance to restore appropriate levels of
transparency and disclosure for merchants by
implementing a voluntary code of conduct.18Backgrounder 125 | 9
Merchants must understand clearly the implica-
tions of their choices before they adopt new debit
card services, especially in terms of potentially
higher interchange fees. 
Finally, the guiding principle for addressing
business practices in the context of a voluntary code
of conduct should be the extent to which they
contravene Canadian competition laws. At face
value at least, requiring a merchant to accept debit
cards because it accepts credit cards would resemble
tied-selling, which is a practice that can be
disallowed under Canadian competition laws if the
practice has substantially lessened competition, or is
likely to do so. To the extent that this practice could
be prohibited under competition laws, it should 
be restricted under the voluntary code of conduct. 
The restriction should apply to all transactions,
including online purchases, telephone order-
transactions, and contactless transactions. 
It is unclear, however, if other practices that have
been the subject of complaints contravene
competition laws. The fact that some co-badge
debit cards may give priority to one network at the
expense of another does not seem to resemble any
act that may be reprehensible under competition
laws. As long as merchants are made fully aware of
the implications of their choices, we should not
limit the kinds of arrangement that payment
networks propose to merchants. Before addressing a
business practice in the context of a voluntary code
of conduct, a clear case should be made that it
contravenes competition laws.19
FAIRNESS: While higher interchange fees may –
because they can potentially increase the level of
transactions on a given payment system – enhance
the efficiency of payment systems, they do raise
fairness concerns. To the extent that merchants pass
merchant fees on to all customers in the form of
higher priced goods and services, customers who
use payment methods associated with fewer
benefits such as cash nonetheless share the costs of
payment methods associated with higher benefits.
In addition, payment methods associated with
fewer benefits such as cash tend to be used more
heavily by poorer segments of the population
(Levitin 2008). 
VISA and MasterCard, however, typically impose
contractual obligations on payment processors –
which are ultimately imposed on merchants – that
prevent merchants from imposing a surcharge on
transactions using their networks. Some merchants
also claim that they were prevented from providing
discounts for cash purchases and/or to advertise
such discounts, but VISA and MasterCard dispute
this assertion (Standing Senate Committee on
Banking, Trade and Commerce 2009). 
To the extent that the government is more
concerned with fairness than efficiency in this
particular instance, it should require that merchants
be allowed to provide discounts or surcharges
according to what form of payment is used for a
given transaction. 
Conclusion
The entry of VISA and MasterCard into the
Canadian debit card market represents unprece-
dented change to the competitive environment.
New payment networks will increase competition
and should lead to more innovation and ultimately
better debit products for cardholders and
merchants. Payment networks, however, should be
allowed to compete on a level playing field and
adequate transparency and disclosure should be
available to all market participants. Accordingly,
this Backgrounder makes the following three
recommendations. 
First, Interac must be allowed to transform itself
into a for-profit organization. The current situation
where our national debit network is saddled with
heavy operating constraints and must compete with
largely unregulated firms is untenable. 
Second, differences in regulatory treatment of
payment networks should be minimized. In
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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particular, this paper recommends that the
Canadian Payments Association ensure that its
internal and external consultation process does not
impose unnecessary delay in bringing new products
and services to market.
Third, this Backgrounder supports the adoption
of a voluntary code of conduct, with refinements to
that currently proposed by the federal department
of finance. A voluntary code of conduct should
include measures to enhance transparency and
disclosure for merchants to allow them to make
informed decisions. In addition, the code could
address possible business practices that might be
cause for concern under Canadian competition
laws. For example, requiring a merchant to accept
debit cards because it accepts credit cards from the
same network would resemble tied-selling and
could therefore be addressed in the voluntary code
of conduct. Lastly, to the extent that the
government is more concerned with fairness than
efficiency in this particular instance, the code
should allow merchants to provide discounts or
surcharges. 
The implementation of these recommendations
will help pave the way to an efficient and fair
outcome to the current changes taking place in 
the Canadian debit market. Changes are spreading
rapidly, and policy changes are required to 
facilitate competition among networks while
ensuring transparency, disclosure and fairness 
in the debit market.
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